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ABSTRACT 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT) and the need to 
disseminate effective services to human beings across IoT 
environments has paved the way for the physical world to be 
digitally connected. Sensing has been at the center of all these 
proliferations, however, the need to enforce the security of 
information for smart IoT environments, connected ‘things’ and 
systems like Industrial Control Systems (ICS), cyber-physical 
Systems (CPS) and the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) networks has given rise to the considerations of IoT 
security. Most of the IoT devices currently do not have advanced 
security capabilities and given the continued increase of IoT 
device’s capabilities, information produced by these devices has 
increased in volume and complexity over the years, effectively 
widening the threat landscape. Currently, IoT-based attacks seem 
to be channeled towards the control systems and the Critical 
Infrastructure Systems (CIS) that mainly comprise embedded IoT 
devices and systems. The main target, however, is the information 
that is produced and exchanged by these devices and the services 
rendered. It is imperative to note that there is a need to ensure the 
safety of this information. This is as this information may involve 
attributes that can be inadvertently used to compromise the 
overall resilience, security and privacy of an IoT system and its 
users. 
Virtual sensors provide an abstraction of physical computing 
resources that are able to be adopted as logical representations 
across users which brings about effectiveness [1] on how sensor 
data is processed during data fusion. However, during machine 
learning process, there may exist security challenges that can 
interfere or change the fusing data. While virtual sensors provide 
cost-effective approaches that allow them to utilise nodes when 
only needed, the use of virtual sensing has triggered other 
alarming security challenges in IoT environments. The most 
infamous security challenge has been passive and active threats 
that exist in virtual sensors in IoT ecosystems [33]. Preliminary 
studies that have been conducted on virtual sensors [2-7] have 
mainly focused on how WSNs can be deployed in a virtualised 
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environment in order to achieve sensing as a service (SaaS) but 
security of virtual sensors is least explored under these 
circumstances. This research has been motivated by the fact that 
the User-feedback Process (UFP) in DIVS could advertently be 
attacked through malicious inputs through labeled data in order to 
influence the behavior of virtual sensors. Still attackers could use 
virtual sensors to push malicious code into IoT devices [21]. 
Consequently, besides attacking IoT devices over prevailing 
threats, adversaries can use sensor instances to attack other 
interconnected sensors in the case of virtual sensors.  
Therefore, the authors prioritize the security perspective of virtual 
sensors from the standpoint of identifying the threats in virtual 
sensors and suggesting research directions. Additionally, a 
discussion that has used the Dynamic Intelligent Virtual Sensor 
(DIVS) proposition as a basis has formed the focal part of this 
study. Consequently, the authors through this paper take a step to 
give an introspection on the risks posed by threats in virtual 
sensors in IoT environment. To bring out the problem explicitly, 
the authors consider a fictitious hypothetical scenario below that 
has mainly been used for illustration purposes.  
XYZ is a smart campus, that allows real-time activity 
detection in study rooms. A user’s activity can be detected 
through the presence of a DIVS, which inputs sensor data 
like sound level, temperature, motion etc. X is a malicious 
user who has managed to interfere with the DIVS during 
the User Feedback Process (UFP). Also, X has been able 
to masquerade using false labels and has managed to 
mount multiple illegal sensor nodes with the same 
identities within the network and this has also enabled a 
total shut down of the smart cameras. X has been able to 
achieve this because it is possible in the UFP to achieve 
this for instance through pushing a button or input of data 
through a panel. Apart from that, information between 
other DIVS has been re-routed and dynamic services have 
been denied. 
Based on the aforementioned challenge in the hypothetical 
scenario, it is important to note that the existence of DIVS, acts 
as an open environment for IoT-based virtual sensor threats given 
that, at the time of writing, the security aspects of virtual sensors 
has not been explored.  
Contributions: The authors give the contribution of this paper as 
follows: 
1. Give an introspection of the threats in IoT in the
perspective of DIVS dubbed Virtual Internet of
Threats (VIoT);
2. Explore the possible IoT threats from an information
security perspective using DIVS as a baseline;
3. Explore open security problems in virtual sensors,
give a discussion on the propositions and suggest
research direction worth taking.
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Organisation: The remainder of this paper is structured as 
follows: Section 2 covers the background while Section 3 handles 
Virtual Internet of Threats (VIoT) adversarial model.  After this, 
Section 4 explains the VIoT introspection in DIVS. This is 
followed by Section 5 that presents open security problems and 
future research directions. Next, Section 6 gives a discussion of 
the study. Finally, the paper concludes in Section 7 and make 
mention of future work.      
2. BACKGROUND
This section provides background information on the following 
areas: virtual sensing in IoT, DIVS, and the need for DIVS 
security across IoT paradigms. Virtual sensing in IoT has been 
discussed in this paper to show how pertinent virtualisation is for 
the sensor networks in IoT. DIVS which is an intelligent virtual 
sensor forms the basis of the discussion in this paper. The need 
for DIVS security is discussed to show different technologies in 
WSN that face security challenges. These discussions are relevant 
to the study presented in the rest of the paper. 
Virtual sensing in IoT 
Research by [5] has highlighted that Virtualised Wireless Sensor 
Networks (VWSNs) are important for IoT paradigms if the 
paradigm is to achieve effective connectivity, scalability and cost 
saving approaches, which allows IoT users to get dedicated 
resources [8]. Apart from that, sensor virtualisation consists of 
instances running over applications on a sensor node that 
emulates a physical sensor. Additionally, virtual sensing in IoT is 
supported by several standards like ZigBee, Zwave, 6LowPAN, 
802.11 and IEEE 802.15.4 [9-12]. Notably, research by [1] gives 
a different perspective of VWSN that is based on VWSN’s 
implementation. These authors highlight that VWSNs can be 
implemented either at node-level or at network-level, where 
node-level allows multiple sensor tasks to be computed at a single 
sensor node concurrently. On the other hand, network-level 
virtualisation allows the formation of Virtual Sensor Network 
(VSN) by a subset of WSN nodes. This is apparent in the 
subsequent sections of this paper. Also, research by [13] has 
proposed a Dynamic Intelligent Virtual Sensor (DIVS) that can 
create abstraction layers over physical infrastructures to enable 
the logical instances to perform tasks, which has been discussed 
in the section to follow.  
Dynamic intelligent virtual sensor (DIVS)
The Dynamic Intelligent Virtual Sensor (DIVS) which has been 
used as a preliminary study in this paper presents the notion of a 
virtual sensor that is deployed in a heterogeneous sensing 
environment. Based on Figure 1, DIVS has a machine learning 
component based on labelled instances. More precisely, DIVS 
uses heterogeneous sensor data which is able to undergo data 
fusion [13], [22]. Through the ability of online learning, DIVS is 
able to adjust with the changing nature of an IoT environment. 
Generally, DIVS creates an abstraction layer that overlays the 
physical infrastructure and the abstraction layer caters mainly of 
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multiple logical instances [22]. Based on the availability of these 
logical instances, services can easily be managed or created based 
on available fusing data. An important aspect that forms part of 
the security consideration is that the user through the User 
Feedback Process (UFP) (see Fig 1) is able to provide 
input/feedback for learning purposes. The UFP in its entirety is 
not a secure communication process in DIVS.  Figure 1 shows the 
DIVS data processing pipeline. 
       Figure 1: DIVS Data processing pipeline [22] 
The UFP, marked X in the figure, is intended to be a process 
involving users to, on request by the DIVS or based on the user, 
provide information to improve the accuracy of the DIVS. The 
information is typically in the format of labeled data, i.e. the 
correct classification of the current state. Hence, the provision of 
false labels could rather quickly deteriorate the accuracy of 
prediction being made by the DIVS, i.e. the data fusion is 
modified through the online learning approach such that false 
predictions will be made, however, this channel faces a variety of 
threats. Of interest in this research is to explore the threat 
landscape from an information security perspective, using DIVS 
as a foundation. Also, it is important to explore how a DIVS 
attack can influence the accuracy of the DIVS.  
Need for DIVS security across IoT paradigms 
There is a need for enforcing the security technique of the DIVS 
in the IoT paradigm. This is because the common approach for 
the design of security solutions for sensors are generally related 
to the security functions that an IT product gives [34]. The authors 
of this paper emphasize the assumptions (threat model) that may 
be exploited by an attacker, owing to the fact, that the 
requirements of DIVS may change over time given the 
environment it is deployed in.  In fact, the safety of virtual sensors 
should be supported by a number of architectural protocols, and 
the safety of this communication has also been backed up by the 
security of these protocols or technologies. That notwithstanding, 
the increased complexity of IoT threats and attacks has increased 
the need for sensor technology sensitization in order to ensure 
more secure communication. For example, 5G technology 
provides seamless connectivity due to low latency and high 
security through wireless communication, however, this 
technology requires to be authenticated [14], while ZigBee [18] 
uses low power wireless transmission and faces integrity and 
encryption issues. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) which 
uses frequency waves requires encryption due to the susceptibility 
of integrity attacks [15]. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) 
which use wireless technique to propagate requires encryption 
since information collected by sensors is sent to the server [16]. 
Wireless-Fidelity (Wi-Fi) that uses radio frequency signals 
requires authentication due to potential unauthorised access of 
information [19]. Message Queuing Telemetry Transport 
(MQTT) is a messaging protocol that uses a publish and subscribe 
model and it requires encryption techniques. MQTT has been 
used in the implementation of the DIVS concept, while IEEE 
802.15.4 and 6LoWPAN for wireless requires authentication each 
respectively [20]. Finally, LoRaWAN which also uses long range 
wireless propagation mechanism requires encryption due to end 
devices being able to send messages to gateways [20]. 
In view of the foregoing, the DIVS concept [13] represents a 
virtual sensor that does not possess a security component and this 
study explores the extent to which DIVS may pose as a security 
threat or other threats that DIVS may face in an IoT environment. 
A successful attack at the DIVS concept could fulfil some of the 
adversarial motives that have been mentioned in the hypothetical 
scenario among others. Based on these shortcomings, the 
adversarial threat model is discussed next. 
3  VIRTUAL INTERNET OF THREAT (VIOT) 
ADVERSARIAL THREAT MODEL 
In this section, the authors highlight the adversarial threat model 
that is centered on the DIVS [13] based on the hypothetical 
scenario illustrated in Section 1. Insights on the DIVS concept are 
highlighted on a high-level standpoint (See Fig 1), which together 
with the threat model, that is presented in this section have been 
used to sum up the Internet of threat introspection discussion in 
this paper. The DIVS concept has been discussed in this section 
because it represents a virtual sensor that is susceptible to sensor 
threats from a security point of view. 
 VIoT Attacker’s Capability 
A threat is an act that can exploit security weaknesses in a system 
and exerts a negative impact on it. Sensor threats are active 
malicious actions that are more focused on compromising sensors 
through interference, leakage of information, draining sensor 
energy or through Denial of Service (DoS), etc [21]. Virtual 
sensors allow encapsulated layers of software to be able to 
provide services as a physical sensor, where sensor instances can 
perform tasks like physical sensors. However, the sensor 
instances are susceptible to threats just like in any virtualised 
environment – a virtualized environment involves virtual (rather 
than actual) computer hardware platforms, storage devices, and 
computer network resources [35]. Most of the sensor sources of 
threats result from the communication and interaction of the 
embedded physical and virtual processes of the devices. An 
assumption is made in our threat model that, the UFP in the DIVS 
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is an insecure channel that involves a range of sensors, where 
some may be illegal sensor nodes or the information being relayed 
may travel over insecure channels (See hypothetical scenario, 
Section 1). Also, based on the hypothetical scenario, the authors 
assume that any user interacting with the DIVS service cannot be 
trusted, therefore raising trust issues. Additionally, the authors 
assume that integrity, confidentiality and authentication, which 
are some of the prime goals that are meant to be achieved in DIVS 
could be violated by a malicious user in the UFP. In this context, 
the threats could be targeted to the data fusion model through 
online learning based on the UFP. 
Threat Model 
The threat model, for the focus of analysis, is a culmination of the 
possibilities that may be experienced as a result of the execution 
of the DIVS (see Fig. 1) service to and from the oracle/user for 
labeled instances, which has been termed as the DIVS service-
UFP.  Given that virtual sensors are deployed in an uncontrolled, 
potentially open environment, the authors assume that the UFP 
has the potential of being captured or being tampered with by an 
adversary using a variety of techniques. While the existing 
literature [21], [32] has shown that sensors can resist being 
tampered with, e.g., through tamper-resistant packaging, our 
threat model focuses on the data transmitted between the oracle 
and the DIVS service. The authors argue that an adversary may 
be more interested to attack the UFP, resulting in inaccurate 
predictions, i.e, that can allow one to provide false labels in order 
to interfere with online learning of DIVS. This has also been 
based on the propositions of the Dolev-Yao intruder attacker 
model which is the basic foundation for adversary scenario 
[23].  The Dolev-Yao attacker model employs a set of rules that 
can outline the potential actions used by an attacker concerning 
information exchanged between parties during protocol 
execution. This foundation shows the duplex communication 
between two distinct nodes in a WSN during normal user-
feedback process to the DIVS service. During this UFP to DIVS 
service, A as depicted in equation (i) could easily be transmitting 
an encrypted message {M} to B and Z could intercept {M} and 
re-encrypt to M ({M}) as is shown in (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) 
respectively. 
 A(send) ->(transmit_the_process) B(receive): {M}(encrypted)_B (i) 
 B(send) ->(echo_ACK) A(receive): {M}_A(encrypted) (ii) 
This could be intercepted, modified and rerouted easily, hence the 
need to create or have correlating aspects;  
Z (adversary)->(intercept) B: {M}_B(encrypted) (iii) 
B (received from Z) ->(echo_ACK) Z: {M}_Z(encrypted) (iv) 
M (Z -> A: {M}_A) (Re-encrypted) (v) 
Considering the aforementioned, there is a possibility of an 
adversary interference with the UFP to limit the accurate 
prediction of the DIVS service. The assumption is that the 
possible attacks that may be directed to DIVS service hold some 
characteristics as follows: 
• False labels to the DIVS could interfere with the
online learning process by giving outputs other than
the originally intended hence affecting the accuracy of
DIVS prediction during data fusion.
• The UFP between on the DIVS service may be an
insecure transmission mechanism through which an
adversary is able to have full or partial control which
may make him able to modify or tamper.
• An adversary can deny service to the DIVS
communication channel which may interfere with the
UFP.
• If a gatekeeper is tasked in managing the UFP, an
adversary can attack and capture it which eventually
may break the entire communication channel of the
UFP.
• Still, an adversary over the UFP channel could obtain
sensitive data in a malicious way that could violate
data privacy.
• An adversary could use the sensor instances of the
DIVS as instruments of launching sensor-based or
other malicious attacks.
Based on the above-mentioned characteristics, there is a need to 
highlight the security goals that are aimed to be achieved by the 
DIVS architecture based on the UFP. The prioritisation of the 
security goals depends on the control environment and how the 
services are dispatched. These goals have been inclined towards 
the integrity of the information being transmitted in order to avoid 
the injection of false data, communication alteration, tampering 
between the users and the DIVS service, authenticity of 
transmitting parties, privacy and trust. These concerns mainly 
represent top concerns that can be shared across IoT-based 
systems. 
4. VIRTUAL INTERNET OF THREAT (VIOT)
INTROSPECTION IN DIVS 
In this section, the authors highlight VIoT introspection 
approaches in DIVS as a contribution that has been given from a 
security perspective. This section has concentrated on showing 
how virtual sensors are susceptible to threats and attacks in DIVS. 
This is then followed by a discussion on virtual sensor threats, 
vulnerabilities and attacks. It is important to note that the VIoT 
discussion presented in this section is inclined to the initially 
described DIVS and based on the analogies of the hypothetical 
scenario (See Section 1). 
VIoT from a security perspective 
Virtual sensors that mainly emulate physical sensors represent the 
interaction with the target environment using specialised 
software. The software in this context is used to allow the sensing 
25
V.R. Kebande, J. Bugeja and J.A. Persson
CPSS2019, October 22, 2019, Bilbao, Spain Internet of Threats Introspection in Dynamic intelligent Virtual Sensing 
of various context-aware entities in order to have a virtualised 
representation that emulates the physical electronic sensor nodes, 
where mostly many activities are associated to the traditional 
WSNs [25], [26]. For example, the most effective way to manage 
a million sensors that are deployed in a smart IoT environment, 
or a smart city, to monitor people’s activities in order to collect 
sensor data is to apply intelligent virtual sensors. This is a cost-
effective exercise where an application can utilise virtual sensors 
or opportunistic sensing [24]. From an information security 
standpoint, the existence of configuration flaws or vulnerabilities 
in sensors allow an adversary to use virtual sensors as instruments 
of perpetrating attacks. This is because a number of resources end 
up being shared which in the long run opens the possibility of 
shred vulnerabilities. 
The authors have explored a more recent study on virtual sensors 
[1-10], from how they are implemented; node-level sensor and 
network-level sensor virtualisation. From this study, open 
problems and future research directions have also been noted from 
the study. Additionally, the authors have also been able to classify 
from the literature (using √  and X to show the presence and 
absence of a virtual sensor component respectively), whether the 
identified sensors have intelligent and security components and 
this is shown in Table 1. 
From Table 1, the DIVS [13] is an intelligent sensor that allows 
multiple logical instances to run simultaneously through node 
level virtualisation and based on its representation, information 
security concerns are hardly addressed. Importantly, the study on 
threats should be more focused on checking the integrity of the 
information being transmitted from the user to the DIVS service 
through the UFP that was highlighted in the adversarial threat 
model. Next, a cloud of virtual sensors by [27] has a sensor 
implemented at network level virtualisation and this sensor is not 
intelligent and the security and information privacy concerns are 
not discussed.  
The possible threat area for this sensor is that it lacks security 
techniques for virtual, intermediate nodes and aggregating data. 
Also, a virtual sensor as a service [28] that is implemented at 
network level virtualisation level has not highlighted security and 
privacy concerns which remains open due to lack of a security 
component in the cloud which makes it susceptible to attack. 
Finally, an interactive model based virtual sensors for IoT 
applications [29] also has open potential threats that need security 
Literature on 
Virtual 
Sensors 
Dynamic 
and 
Intelligent 
Node-level 
Sensor 
Virtualisation 
Network-level 
Sensor 
Virtualisation 
Information 
Security & 
Privacy 
Sensor Threat 
1 Dynamic 
Intelligent 
Virtual 
Sensor 
(DIVS) [13] 
           √ √            X           X 
Integrity of 
transmitted 
information, 
privacy and 
trust of the 
transmitting 
parties 
2 A cloud of 
virtual 
sensors [27] 
         X              X √             X 
Security of 
virtual and 
intermediate 
nodes and 
security of 
aggregating 
data 
3 Virtual sensor 
as a service 
[28] 
         X              X √           X 
Lack of 
security 
component in 
the cloud-
centric IoT 
architecture. 
Lack of sensor 
activity 
detection 
4 A location-
based 
interactive 
model of IoT-
sensors [29] 
√ √             X             X 
Secure virtual 
Sensor instance 
monitoring and 
integrity checks 
Table 1. Virtual sensors implementation level overview and possible threats 
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monitoring of sensor instances coupled with integrity checks. It is 
worth to mention that what is partial and what is similar on 
information security and privacy is shown in Table 1 and the 
discussion has been presented from a cursory investigation. 
VIoT security goals 
The IoT ecosystem which is heterogeneous consists of “things”, 
which also consist of a number of sensors that are able to collect 
and transmit sensor data based in an IoT environment. The need 
for access-control infrastructure in IoT has been highlighted as an 
important approach that can mitigate security breaches and 
leakage of sensor data. Generally, IoT consists of features that are 
able to be sensed in a computer network, actuation nodes etc. 
These “things” can also be monitored within an IoT environment, 
either in a virtual or physical setting as is highlighted by the IEEE 
1451 family of standards and interfaces [30]. The security in IoT 
context plays a vital role for ensuring the safety of information 
and the devices within IoT ecosystem. Figure 2 shows the 
relationship that exists between the sensor data and security goals. 
The security layers should be added to the communication and 
transmission of sensor data and the things that carry data need to 
have a relationship to the physical devices in order for 
communication to be complete. Other relevant devices include a 
data capturing device, sensors and actuators [5]. General IoT 
communicating devices ensure effective communication over a 
device that has embedded processing. Consequently, from the 
perspective of IoT, it is possible to protect sensor data, in 
memory, at rest, in transit and also end-to-end security from the 
user to the service to the physical hardware.  
Figure 2: The relationship between VIoT goals 
Figure 2, shows a representation of the VIoT security goals that 
need to be achieved by the virtual IoT environment. It is 
imperative to note that the prime objective of these goals is to 
ensure the safety of the sensor data and communication. 
Authenticity is the basic building block for a strong IoT 
ecosystem while privacy and trust limit the unnecessary exchange 
of information through proper verifications of the identities of 
things and users. IoT integrity provides a mechanism of 
cryptographic protection of sensor data, which provides a strong 
approach for end-to-end protection of data in IoT environment. 
Most of the IoT-based virtual sensors transmit information 
without necessary safety even though security holds paramount 
importance. The security and privacy of virtual sensors is a 
critical issue that at the time of writing this article has not been 
explored extensively. Disregarding the security of information 
that is passed by virtual sensors means that the full benefits of IoT 
cannot be achieved. Additionally, the availability of many IoT 
communication devices has increased the threat landscape and 
security risks have increased. Given the increased number of 
connected devices, the IoT technologies also face formidable 
security challenges, standardisation issues and communication 
complexities. Based on the DIVS goals, we have classified threats 
based on active or passive threats. In this context, active threats 
are achieved by modifying the functionality of IoT systems while 
passive threats are through the communication channel. This is 
shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Mapping DIVS security goals to potential threats 
The DIVS security goals have been mapped to the potential 
virtual sensor threats. Based on the three goals: integrity, 
authenticity, privacy and trust, a selected number of threats are 
mapped to each goal in a generic way. However, each of the IoT 
supported technology could still face other attacks. For example, 
Man In The Middle (MITM), data tampering, malicious input and 
impersonation attacks are categorized as active threats under 
DIVS integrity and authenticity goals respectively as is shown in 
Figure 2 previously. Apart from that, data collection, tracking 
users, eavesdropping, and traffic analysis have been categorised 
as passive threats under DIVS privacy goal.  
That notwithstanding, IoT security technologies that support 
virtual sensing (See Section 2.3) are mainly constructed to 
support low-power devices and resource-constrained devices. As 
a result, the expansion of IoT and the complexity of how 
information security can be managed keeps changing. It is worth 
elaborating that there exist other forms of attacks that culminate 
from IoT communication technologies, which in the long run 
affect the virtual sensing. For example, privacy of information 
and are threats that face 5G [14], RFID [15] faces integrity 
attacks, WSN [16] technology faces Denial of Service (DoS) and 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Low energy 
Bluetooth [17] faces the threats of blue jacking and blue snarfing, 
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ZigBee [18] is susceptible to Man in the Middle (MITM) attacks, 
eavesdropping for Wireless Fidelity (WIFI) [19] and port 
obscurity for MQTT [20]. Physical and Media Access Control 
(MAC) attacks for IEEE 802.15.4 [20], DoS and eavesdropping 
for LoRaWAN [20] and IP spoofing for 6LoWPAN [20]. It is 
important to note that there may exist many threats as a result and 
the selected threats have been used for illustrative purposes.     
5. OPEN SECURITY ISSUES AND RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS 
In this section, the authors give a discussion on the open security 
issues in virtual sensors and research directions that are worth 
taking. The important aspect of the aforementioned concept is the 
learning/adaptability capability of DIVS to changing 
environments. VIoT concept which culminates from the 
susceptibility of virtual sensors to threats in the IoT environment 
is still an emerging phenomenon given that still this research area 
is less explored at the time of writing this paper. Furthermore, the 
rise of the threats in IoT has been as a result of increased sensor 
technologies, increased number of devices, and increased amount 
of information that are produced by these devices. For example, 
the DIVS concept puts forward a virtual sensor that is deployed 
in the IoT environment to accumulate sensor data in an 
environment that has a multitude of sensor threats. The authors 
explore the following issues and research directions: 
• Protecting the communication channel from virtual
sensor: Little focus has been put on how one can ensure
that the operations of virtual sensors are able to overcome
integrity threats. It is important for IoT tool designers to
be able to design tools that are able to identify threats that
relate to malicious configurations that can hamper or
compromise the integrity of sensor data. Further research
should also focus on creating dynamic intelligent virtual
sensor configurations that are tamper free from alterations
and modification of communication process. Through this,
the accuracy of the online learning process can be
guaranteed.
• Virtual sensor resilience: Generally virtual sensors form
part of the IoT system at large and it is important to ensure
that if the virtual nodes are compromised, the IoT’s
functionality should continue to operate. It is vital that the
compromised nodes are identified, isolated and reported.
Further research should be focused on not being able to
change the existing functionality of the IoT system in case
vulnerabilities or an attack is detected, but also for the
virtual sensor to continue operating with a high level of
accuracy.
• Privacy: There is a need for ensuring that privacy
enhancing technologies are employed to IoT generated
data that moves across connected things through data
segregation and separation. Research directions should
be more focused on protection through aggregation of
data through the use of different multiple levels of secure 
access in order to prevent unauthorised access to 
individual data even when security cameras are used. 
• Virtual sensor attribution: While it remains important
to discover what IoT device may be attributed to a
particular threat or attack, it is also important to focus on
virtual sensor attribution. This is mainly because when
virtual sensors may be used as attack objects, they have
a possibility of interfering with an IoT environment
either actively or passively [33].
6. DISCUSSIONS
We revisit the hypothetical scenario that has been highlighted in 
Section 1 of this paper. The scenario mainly focused on the 
drawbacks that are achieved as a result of attacks on integrity, 
confidentiality and authenticity as a result of the existing threats 
on virtual sensors. Given how virtual sensing is achieved in an 
IoT environment, succeeding with these attacks is considered a 
serious breach of security techniques that can easily compromise 
a whole IoT environment. X, the malicious user from the 
hypothetical scenario (section 1) has been able to achieve 
malicious goals through spoofing and the threats are realised as 
soon as X is able to shut down the smart cameras and mount illegal 
sensor nodes through a rented VM. Consequently, given that the 
scenario pinpoints the failure on how security could be enforced, 
and a success on the malicious goals by X, we review the security 
goals that the DIVS which has been used as a basis of study in 
this paper is meant to achieve. It is therefore, an important 
measure to ensure the adoption of an IoT architecture with 
security capabilities for the DIVS/virtual sensors. 
The security techniques that can help to protect virtual sensors in 
the IoT environment should mainly focus on how the information 
that is passed between sensors and the environment is being 
sensed. While the internet and communication carry much 
importance, it is also important to say that it acts as a safe haven 
for attackers and it could be used to propagate attacks. If we 
revisit the DIVS concept (section 2.2), it is an example of a virtual 
and dynamic intelligent sensor that needs information security 
protection techniques that can safeguard information that is being 
relayed. VIoT introspection attempts to do an extensive 
exploration on how susceptible the virtual sensors are to threat 
tribulations in an IoT environment and also it shows the 
drawbacks that this may have to IoT communication technologies 
that has been shown in Table 3 of this article. A more realistic 
approach that highlights the mechanism of hardening the virtual 
sensing in IoT is the use of four-layer IoT architecture that has the 
support of security recommendations that are aimed at protecting 
IoT communications [31], [32]. This security recommendation 
span across four layers namely the application layer (1) that 
ensures there is proper authentication/key agreement and privacy 
during message passing. Then this is followed by a support layer 
(2) that ensures that there is secure cloud computing in case
resources are being shared, then network layer (3) that supports
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identity authentication and encryption approaches. Lastly, the 
perception layer (4) that supports encryption and key agreement 
in order to support the sensor data. Given that there is direct 
information passing at the DIVS, it makes the threats to be likely 
to be forthcoming and based on these, the authors echo the 
importance, that the four-layer IoT security architecture, may play 
as far as this information security of DIVS is concerned. If we 
revisit the user-feedback process (UFP)/flow in the DIVS, 
information is expected to be transmitted or sent by authentic 
users from the application layer where their authenticity and 
privacy can be enhanced. It is important to say that the 
functionality of virtual sensors allows logical instances to be used 
on an on-demand basis and this raises the question of the logical 
instances being threats to other virtual sensors/instances. In this 
case, the virtual instance could be used to propagate attacks, 
where it could be possible for the attacker to use an instance and 
then shut down the virtual component or change the location of 
the virtual component.  
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper has introduced the concept of VIoT introspection and 
the authors have concentrated on giving discussions on the need 
for introducing information security layers in virtual sensing. This 
study gives a comprehensive overview at virtual sensors from an 
information security perspective. It is the authors’ belief that the 
study will have a broad impact as far as virtual sensor threats are 
concerned.  While this is work in progress, future work is aimed 
at creating a real-time attack detection VIoT test-bed to be able to 
identify and mitigate the virtual IoT sensor threats. 
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